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National Regulation of Transborder Data Flows
by Mark B. Feldman* and David R. Garcia**
I. Introduction
Man's rapidly developing ability to transfer information across na-
tional boundaries has become a crucial component in our increasingly
integrated world economy. The advent of the computer has revolution-
ized man's capacity to process and store information. Simultaneously,
man's capacity to transmit information has been dramatically increased
by a variety of telecommunications innovations, including increasingly
effective cable transmissions and orbiting satellites. Together, these two
technologies have resulted in a transborder data flow (TDF) essential to
expanding international economic development.'
The economic implications of TDF are particularly significant for a
post-industrial society such as the United States. Many of America's
most successful multinational corporations are involved in computer
technology, data processing, telecommunications, or information inten-
sive service industries, such as banking and insurance.2 Advances in
TDF technology have had a significant impact on the way companies
involved in these and other industries transact international business.
For example, it is now possible for a multinational corporation to be
monitored on a global scale with a precision undreamed of a decade ago.
Providing data processing services abroad has itself become a mul-
tibillion dollar international industry. 3 The export of information
processing services and technology is now the single most profitable com-
* Counsel to Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Irvine, Washington, D.C.; Formerly Deputy
Legal Adviser of the Department of State; A.B. 1957, Wesleyan University; LL.B. 1960,
Harvard University.
** Associate, Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Irvine, Washington, D.C.; A.B. 1976, Harvard
University; J.D. 1979, Georgetown University.
I For purposes of this article the authors define TDF as the transmission from one nation
to another of units of information coded electronically for processing or storage by one or more
digital computers. This definition purposefully excludes transborder data flows resulting from
media products, news broadcasts, voice-to-voice telephone calls, television programming, cable-
grams, and telex services.
2 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, The Information Economy: Definition and Mea-
surement, O.T. Pub. No. 77-12(1) (1977) [hereinafter cited as The Information Economy].
3 See International Communications Reorganization Act of 1981: Hearings on H.R.
1957 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 212 (1981) (statement of Richard L. Crandall) [hereinafter cited as I.C. Reorganization
Hearings].
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ponent of U.S. foreign trade.4 Advances in telecommunications and
computer technologies now enable American computer service compa-
nies to offer data processing services world-wide, using data storage and
processing facilities maintained in the United States and selected foreign
locations.
During the last few years, however, a number of both industrialized
and developing countries have begun to regulate and control TDF. This
regulation results from a variety of concerns among foreign governments
relating to economic independence, cultural identity, and individual pri-
vacy rights. The primary motivation for such regulation, however, ap-
pears to be the desire to participate in industries that may form the
foundation of tomorrow's economy. 5 Although most governments are
still formulating their TDF policies, a number of them have taken ac-
tions that restrict TDF. Such actions raise serious concerns about future
conduct, which could prevent optimal utilization of the new technologies
now becoming available to mankind.
At the international level, a number of organizations are now grap-
pling with the TDF issues. The Council of Europe and the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development have recently issued, re-
spectively, a treaty 6 and voluntary guidelines7 dealing with the flow of
information across national borders. In the United Nations, TDF issues
are now on the agenda of the Economic and Social Council and the
Commission on Transnational Corporations.8 The Commission of the
European Economic Community (EEC) is actively monitoring develop-
ments in the field of TDF, and the European Parliament has passed a
resolution asking the EEC Council and Commission to adopt a directive
creating a community wide policy. 9 The International Telecommunica-
tions Union and, more especially, its Consultative Committee on Inter-
national Telephone and Telegraph (CCITT), have been involved in
overseeing the technical and operational aspects of transnational com-
munication for a number of years. A group of Third World and Euro-
pean countries have formed the Intergovernmental Bureau for
Informatics (IBI) to study TDF along with a number of other trade ori-
4 The Information Economy, supra note 2, at 52-55.
5 An excellent overview of the various policy goals which prompt TDF regulation is pro-
vided in Novotny, Transborder Data Flows and International Law: A Framework for Policy-
Oriented Inquiry, 16 Stan. J. Int'l Stud. 141 (1980).
6 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of
Personal Data, opened for signature January 28, 1981, Europ. T.S. 108. The Convention was
signed by representatives of Austria, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Lux-
embourg, Sweden, and Turkey on January 28, 1981, but as of this date no members of the
Council of Europe have ratified the treaty.
7 OECD, Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data, OECD Doc. No. ISBN 92-64-12155-2 (March 1980).
8 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the Secretariat, Strengthening
the Negotiating Capacity of Developing Countries, Transnational Corporations and Trans-
border Data Flows: An Overview, U.N. Doc. E/C. 10/87 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Report].
9 See Hondius, Data Law in Europe, 16 Stan. J. Int'l Stud. 87, 109 (1980).
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ented issues. 10
In the United States, TDF issues have been addressed by a number
of government agencies. These agencies include the Departments of
State and Commerce, the Office of the Special Trade Representative,
and the Federal Communications Commission.
In addition, a plethora of private organizations have become in-
volved in TDF issues. These organizations include the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the Computer and Business Equipment
Manufacturers Association, the International Commerce Association, the
Information Industries Association, the International Federation of In-
formation Processing Societies, the Association of Data Processing Serv-
ice Organizations, and the American Bar Association.
Literature about TDF and related issues, written from legal, polit-
ical, and technical perspectives is growing. 1 Nevertheless, there is still
considerable uncertainty as to the nature of the TDF problem and its
dimensions. The authors of this article will examine a number of specific
examples of TDF regulation by national governments, potentially or ac-
tually impinging on the ability of business enterprises to transfer infor-
mation across national borders. These examples will illustrate the
different regulatory strategies being pursued by governments and will
perhaps serve to better define the collection of issues that is loosely re-
ferred to as "transborder data flow."
II. Control of Transborder Data Transmission: Japan and Germany
Transborder data flow is equally dependent upon communications
and data processing technology. Therefore, the most sophisticated com-
puter located in Country A cannot participate in a TDF exchange with-
out some mechanism for transporting data from other countries into
Country A for processing and/or storage and then back out again. Such
critical communication links are particularly vulnerable to national
regulation.
For example, two American computer companies, Control Data
Corporation (Control Data) and Tymshare Inc. (Tymshare), decided
several years ago to offer a broad range of data processing services to
clients in Japan, utilizing computer main frames located in the United
States. For almost five years, however, both companies were unable to
offer the types of services originally planned because of regulatory diffi-
culties encountered in attempting to set up telecommunications links for
transmitting data back to the United States.
10 IBI is an international organization composed of approximately 30 member countries.
IBI's members are primarily developing countries, although Italy, France, and Spain are also
members. See UNESCO, Informatics: A vital factor in development 19 (1980).
1I For some flavor of the wide variety of perspectives reflected in the literature of TDF, as
well as the rapidly increasing extent of that literature, see Novotny, Transborder Data Flows: A
Bibliography, 16 Stan. J. Int'l Stud. 181 (1980).
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At the present time, the most likely mechanism for such transmis-
sion would be a "dedicated" or private leased telephone line between
Japan and the United States. The actual hookup could be accomplished
with either a transoceanic cable or a communications satellite. Such an
arrangement would involve leasing the telephone line at a fixed monthly
rate with guaranteed continuous access to the circuit. In Japan such a
line must be leased from Japan's international record carrier, Kokusai
Denshin Denwa Co., Ltd. (KDD).
While both Control Data and Tymshare have obtained leased lines
from KDD, the lease agreements until recently contained restrictions
that severely impeded the capacity of the companies to provide services
and compete effectively in Japan.' 2  For example, under these agree-
ments both companies were prohibited from connecting the leased line to
more than one computer center within the United States.1 3 Thus, al-
though Control Data has five different data processing locations in the
United States, each performing distinct types of processing operations,
Control Data could offer Japanese customers direct access to the services
and computer capabilities available at only one of its American loca-
tions. Moreover, the application procedure required to obtain a dedi-
cated line from KDD involves an extremely detailed inspection of the
applicant's hardware and software. The thoroughness of this inspection
has led Tymshare to suspect that KDD might be using the application
procedure to acquire technology rather than to monitor the operations of
a foreign company.14
Both companies have also voiced concern that they might not be
able to continue leasing private transatlantic lines when KDD begins us-
ing its new usage sensitive data network known as "VENUS."' 5 Tym-
share has stated that it was offered an arrangement whereby it would be
allowed to offer its entire range of computing services in Japan, but
would be required to utilize a usage sensitive line. The cost of usage
sensitive service depends upon how often it is used and how much infor-
mation is transmitted. According to Tymshare, the usage sensitive pro-
12 See International Data Flow: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1980) (statement of Philip C. Onstad,
Manager of Telecommunications Policy, Control Data Corp.). See also id. at 63 (statement of
Warren E. Burton, Vice President, Tymshare, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as Data Flow Hearings].
13 Id. at 22. The contract between Control Data and KDD provided that the leased line
into the U.S. could only hook up to one processing center, although five such centers are avail-
able. KDD took the position that the transfer of data from one U.S. center to another would
constitute message-switching, which is prohibited by Japanese law. Id. In other words, KDD
felt that if messages could be transmitted between two or more points within the U.S., then the
two computer companies would in effect have gone into the communications business and
could, at least potentially, create their own telephone switching network. See W. Union Int'l,
Inc. (File No. I-T-C 2678-1); ITT World Commun., Inc. (File No. I-T-C 2664-11); and RCA
Global Commun., Inc. (File No. I-T-C 2667-8), petition to deny before F.C.C. (filed April 11,
1979, by Control Data) [hereinafter cited as W. Union Int'l, Inc.].
14 Data Flow Hearings, supra note 12, at 63. In this regard, it is interesting to note that
KDD's sister agency is the largest supplier of computer services in Japan. Id.
15 Id. at 22.
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posal offered by KDD would increase the price of Tymshare's computing
services in Japan by ten times over that of present levels, rendering Tym-
share virtually incapable of competing effectively in the Japanese domes-
tic computer service market. 16
In addition to illustrating the impact of government regulation on
transborder data transmission, the experiences of Tymshare and Control
Data also reveal the extent to which responsibility or authority to deal
with TDF controls is spread over a large number of U.S. government
agencies. Because KDD is an instrument of the Japanese Government,
Tymshare and Control Data looked first to the United States govern-
ment for assistance.1 7 Both companies contacted numerous government
agencies, including the Japan-United States Trade Facilitation Commit-
tee in the Department of Commerce, the National Telecommunications
& Information Administration of the Department of Commerce, the Of-
fice of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, and the State
Department. "I
Under the terms of section 214 of the Communications Act of
1934,19 the interested U.S. international record carriers had to receive
authorization from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in
order to commence the usage sensitive VENUS service between Japan
and the United States. Control Data opposed that application, arguing
that if the application were granted KDD would discontinue leased line
service and would force all computer service companies operating from
the United States to utilize the usage sensitive VENUS service. 20 The
application was also opposed by the Computer and Business Equipment
Manufacturers Association (CBEMA) and the Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations (ADAPSO). Both CBEMA and
ADAPSO argued in submissions to the Common Carrier Bureau of the
FCC that approval should be conditioned on the continued availability
of flat rate leased lines between Japan and the United States. 2 1
The international record carriers responded by emphasizing that the
usage sensitive service being applied for was designed to serve small and
medium volume users who did not have the resources to offer data
processing on the scale of Control Data or Tymshare. 22 They pointed
out that similar services, commenced between the United Kingdom and
16 Id. at 63.
17 Id. Because Post, Telephone, and Telegraph administrations (PTTs) are virtually al-
ways government owned and operated (the U.S. being a major exception), this situation will
exist in almost every negotiation between an American enterprise and a foreign PTT. See Fish-
man, Introduction to Transborder Data Flows, 16 Stan. J. Int'l Stud. 1, 14 (1980).
18 Data Flow Hearings, supra note 12, at 22-23, 63.
19 47 U.S.C. § 241 (1976).
20 Data Flow Hearings, supra note 12, at 23. See also memorandum opinion cited note 22
infra.
21 See W. Union Int'l, Inc., note 13 supra, Comments to F.C.C. (filed April 11, 1979, by
CBEMA), and Application for Review (filed Jan. 14, 1980, by ADAPSO).
22 See W. Union Int'l, Inc., note 13 supra, Memorandum Opinion of F.C.C. at 4 (adopted
Dec. 11, 1979).
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the United States almost three years before, had not resulted in the cur-
tailment of the availability of private leased line services between the
United States and the United Kingdom. 23 The applicants also provided
documents from KDD in which the Japanese agency promised to con-
tinue leased line services. 24 In addition, the applicants suggested that the
FCC's review of KDD policies might well interfere with Japanese
sovereignty. 25
On December 11, 1979, the Common Carrier Bureau of the FCC
ordered commencement of the VENUS service for a one year experimen-
tal period. 26 The Common Carrier Bureau observed that the new service
would suit the needs of a variety of small- and medium-sized computer
service companies. In addition, the Common Carrier Bureau noted that
private line service had never been discontinued or restricted in a case in
which usage sensitive services had been authorized. The Bureau also
stated that "no persuasive evidence has been submitted to indicate that a
discontinuance of private line service to Japan will occur" if the VENUS
service were authorized. 27 Finally, the Bureau noted that the CCITT
resolutions, invoked by those opposing the applications, were not legally
binding and that in any case no Telegraph Regulations had been
violated.28
The authorization for the VENUS service was continued by six
month extensions issued on December 15, 1980, April 20, 1981, and Au-
gust 14, 1981.29 On October 15, 1981, a further one year extension to
October 16, 1982, was granted by the Common Carrier Bureau. The
Bureau stated that because "delicate bilateral negotiations regarding the
availability of private line services [were] taking place" a further exten-
sion was warranted. 30 The VENUS service, therefore, continues at this
time on a temporary basis. The Common Carrier Bureau has not acted
on applications for permanent authority and the full Federal Communi-




26 Id. at 7.
27 Id. at 6.
28 Id. at 6-7.
29 W. Union Int'l, Inc., note 13 supra, Order and Authorization by F.C.C. at 2.
30 Id.
31 The VENUS application was not the first instance in which an application for regula-
tory approval was resisted by parties seeking to gain leverage over a foreign PT'T. In Septem-
ber, 1979, three U.S. telecommunications companies petitioned the FCC for authorization to
begin usage sensitive data service between the United States and Hong Kong. The application
was resisted by ADAPSO acting at the request of General Electric Company, which had been
denied access to a private leased line by Hong Kong's PTT, Cable and Wireless, Ltd. The FCC
refused to link the U.S. common carrier applications with the denial of leased line service to
General Electric, stating that "it could not force foreign correspondents to provide matching
halves of particular circuits, or services which we would require the U.S. carriers to provide
now, or in the future." ITT World Communications, Inc., Western Union International Line,
Inc., RCA Global Communications, Inc., F.C.C. File Nos. I-T-C2664-2, I-T-C2658-2, I-T-
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The authors have been advised that on June 1, 1981, Control Data
began to provide computer processing services in Japan utilizing an un-
restricted leased line between Japan and the United States. Therefore,
almost five years of negotiation were necessary before Control Data
could gain access to an unrestricted lease line for the provision of data
processing services into Japan. Tymshare is still negotiating with the
Japanese over technical points, but now anticipates that an agreement
will be reached in the first part of 1982.
The experiences of Tymshare and Control Data in Japan are not-
isolated incidents.32 There is also considerable concern about the policies
of the German post and telegraph administration, the Bundespost. The
Bundespost controls access to the type of dedicated lease line necessary
for large-scale data transmission. Since late 1978, the Bundespost had,
from time to time, indicated privately to a number of American compa-
nies that all leased line services would be eliminated as of January 1,
1982 in favor of an usage sensitive regime.
In recent months, however, the Bundespost has indicated that the
new regime would not go into effect until later in the year and that, even
then, leased lines would still be available to those companies that main-
tained significant data computer processing facilities within Germany.
The proposed exception for firms utilizing computer facilities within
Germany demonstrates that restriction of access to leased lines can be
used by the local PTT, not only to increase revenue, but also to en-
courage the placement of computer facilities within the country regulat-
ing access to the leased line. Restriction of access to leased lines could
also be used to discourage the offering of computer services by foreign
companies in an effort to foster the growth of the domestic data process-
ing and computer industries. Whatever the motivation, a country's re-
quirement that computer facilities be placed within that country as a
precondition for the granting of access to dedicated leased lines amounts
C2657-3 (released July 12, 1978) (Memorandum Opinion, Order and Authorization) at 11. In
comparison, the FCC's decision to proceed by interim extensions of temporary authority in the
VENUS case due to admitted awareness of "delicate bilateral negotiations" arguably evidences
a willingness to become aware of and react to, broader developments on the international scene
as part of in its decision making.
32 There have also been reports that European PTTs have established a data transmission
network which has excluded American companies desiring to provide computer services. The
system involved, EURONET, was created by setting aside some portion of each PTT's trans-
mission capability solely for the transmission of data, and combining this capacity with com-
puters at various access points in the countries involved. The resulting system allows a user to
access the system and move data without having to purchase his own computers. Instead a user
can either buy or lease a terminal in each of the countries served by EURONET and move data
in this fashion. Some American companies have reported to STR that EURONET's present
policy is to exclude computer service companies not from EEC countries from utilizing the
EURONET system. See I.C. Reorganization Hearings, supra note 3, at 137-49 (appendix to
statement of Geza Feketekuty, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for policy development).
Even more recently, however, Mr. Feketekuty has been quoted as saying that American compa-
nies are now gaining limited access to EURONET. See Seaman, Transborder Data Flow: Dif-
fusing a Burning Issue, 13 Computer Decisions 58, 58 (1981).
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to a "performance requirement" of the type that-tends to create an artifi-
cial distortion in international trade and investment.33 The particular
application may be new, but it is a classic example of the requirement
that an enterprise make an investment in-country as a condition of con-
ducting operations there.
In November, 1981 the authors were informed that the German
PTT was contemplating measures that would force foreign companies to
utilize costly use-sensitive public service lines for data transmissions to
and from Germany, irrespective of the maintenance of computer facili-
ties in Germany. Such restrictions on the use of dedicated leased lines
could create a significant barrier to the provision of computer services to
Germany from locations outside the country. Whether a PTT requires
utilization of in-country computer facilities as a condition for access to
leased lines or compels the utilization of more expensive facilities such as
usage sensitive lines, tremendous pressure is placed on the American en-
terprise to deploy hardware abroad rather than relying on terminals
abroad to transmit data back to computing facilities in the United States
for storage or processing. For example, as a result of such pressures both
Control Data and Tymshare have decided to establish computer facilities
in Japan.34
If applied to internal corporate TDF, such restrictions would affect
the operations of many multinational enterprises. While some compa-
nies may be able to adjust to such a system without undue hardship,
other enterprises may not be in position to respond by deploying com-
puter facilities abroad. Not every enterprise has the resources or the in-
clination to invest in computer facilites in every country in which it
conducts business. For example, one large American bank has indicated
that if significant restrictions are placed on the availability of leased lines
it will not be able to centralize all data processing for its multinational
operations, a move intended to cut costs and improve service.3 5
III. Bilateral Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
The issues raised by TDF may cause one to question whether the
existing international legal regime is adequate to deal with TDF. In
some situations, however, an American enterprise subjected to inequita-
ble or discriminatory practices affecting TDF may enjoy some protection
under the legal regimen established by the bilateral Treaties of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation and similar agreements (FCN treaties).
The United States has concluded FCN treaties with more than thirty
33 For a study of the worldwide use of incentives and performance requirements see Int'l
Trade Administration, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, The Use of Investment Incentives and Per-
formance Requirements by Foreign Governments (1981).
34 See Data Flow Hearings, supra note 12, at 62-63.
35 Id. at 113 (statement of Robert E. L. Walker, Vice President and Counsel, Continental
Illinois Bank).
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foreign states, 36 including the Federal Republic of Germany, 37 France,38
and Japan. 39
While individual treaties vary in detail, they generally have the
same basic scheme. With regard to TDF, the treaty regime includes
(1) national treatment for business enterprises except where specified ac-
tivities, notably communications, are involved; (2) most-favored-nation
treatment where national treatment does not apply; and (3) general
guarantees of "fair and equitable" treatment.
For example, Article VII(l) of the FCN Treaty with the Federal
Republic of Germany stipulates that "[n]ationals and companies of
either Party shall be accorded, within the territories of the other Party,
national treatment with respect to engaging in all types of commercial,
industrial, and other activity for gain .... -4o National treatment is
defined as treatment "no less favorable than the treatment accorded...
in like situations" to nationals or companies of the host country.4 ' Fur-
ther, under the German Treaty, enterprises controlled by nationals of
one party "shall in all that relates to the conduct of the activities thereof,
be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded like enter-
prises controlled by nationals or companies of such other Party."'4 2 Such
national treatment need not be accorded aliens "engaged within its terri-
tories in communications," provided that new limitations on national
treatment are not applied to established activities. 4 3 This exception does
not apply, however, to the use of communications facilities in the con-
duct of other business activities, such as banking. Further, the German
Treaty stipulates that "neither Party shall deny to transportation, com-
munications and banking companies of the other Party the right to
maintain branches and agencies, in conformity with the applicable laws
and regulations, to perform functions necessary for essentially interna-
tional operations in which they engage."'44
Therefore, unless an American company falls within one of the
treaty exceptions, it is entitled, as a matter of international law, to carry
out its business activities, including data processing and international
communications, on the same basis as a German enterprise. In addition,
Article XVII(2) of the Treaty obligates each Party to provide nationals
36 See U.S. Dep't of State, Treaties in Force (1981).
3 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, United States-Ger-
many, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. 3593.
38 Convention of Establishment, Protocol, and Declaration, Nov. 25, 1959, United States-
France, 11 U.S.T. 2398, T.I.A.S. 4625.
39 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, April 2, 1953, United States-Japan,
4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. 2863.
40 Treaty, United States-Germany, supra note 36, art. VII, para. 1.
41 Id. art. XXV, para. 1.
42 Id. art. VII, para. I(c).
43 Id. art. VII, para. 2. Other exceptions include air or water transport, taking and ad-
ministering trusts, banking involving deposits, and the exploitation of natural resources. Id.
44 Id.
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of the other Party "fair and equitable treatment '45 as compared with
that accorded to the nationals, companies, and commerce of any third
country, with respect to, inter ah'a, "the sale of any service sold by the
Government or by any monopoly or agency granted exclusive or special
privileges."'46 This same general regime applies in the territories of other
U.S. FCN treaty partners. 47
Generally, any dispute arising under an FCN treaty, which cannot
be settled by diplomacy or other agreed means, "shall be submitted to
the International Court of Justice."'48 Issues arising under treaties are
generally taken up diplomatically between governments, but American
courts may enforce treaty rights held to be self-executing upon the appli-
cation of an interested private party. 49 In addition, U.S. regulatory
agencies such as the FCC have also considered treaty rights when rele-
vant to a pending matter.50 A company injured by administrative action
in a foreign country, which it believes violates a treaty in force, may also
wish to consider whether comparable relief is available under the laws of
that foreign state.
IV. Regulation of Computer Hardware: Brazil
TDF tensions are not confined to industrialized nations. A conse-
quence of the emerging world economy is the rapid dissemination of data
processing and communication technology in the third world. This
rapid dissemination is a function of international trade and of the man-
agement operations of multinational corporations (MNCs). TDF regula-
tion in developing countries is characterized by a preoccupation with
noneconomic factors, such as perceived threats to national security or
sovereignty as a result of unrestricted TDF. Of course, developing coun-
tries are not without conventional economic motives as well. Indeed, the
existence of both economic and political motivations has contributed in
Brazil to comparatively extreme types of TDF regulation. Such regula-
tion includes prohibition of certain types of hardware and the outright
refusal to allow the import of data processing services in some cases. 5 1
45 Id. art. XVII, para. 2.
46 id. art. XVII, para. 2(c).
47 See French Treaty, supra note 38, arts. IV, V; Japanese Treaty, supra note 39, arts. VI,
VII. See also OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises,
15 Int'l Legal Materials 967 (1976) (reproduced from OECD Press Release of June 21, 1976).
The Declaration establishes similar principles of national treatment for enterprises owned or
controlled by nationals of all member countries operating in their territories. Id. II para. 1.
This Declaration incorporates solemn policy commitments of all the OECD member states ex-
cept Turkey, and a legally binding Decision of the OECD Council provides for notice and
consultation respecting exceptions to national treatment. Id. at 979.
48 Protocol to Treaty, United States-Germany, supra note 37, para. 24.
49 See, e.g., Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981).
50 See In re French Telegraph & Cable Co. (File No. I-T-C 2650) Memorandum Opinion
& Order (adopted March 30, 1979).
51 See Trade Barriers to Telecommunications, Data and Information Services, reprinted
in I.C. Reorganization Hearings, supra note 3, at 140 (statement of Geza Feketekuty, app. B).
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Although among developing countries such regulation is still the excep-
tion rather than the rule, a number of Third World countries have ex-
pressed an interest in creating such regulation, or are currently drafting
such controls.
5 2
A flavor of current Third World attitudes towards TDF may be ob-
tained by examining a recent report entitled Transnational Corporations and
Transborder Dataftow: An Overview, issued by the U.N. Secretariat for the
Commission on Transnational Corporations. 53 The Report's avowed
purpose was to enhance the negotiating capacity of developing countries
in their dealings with multinational corporations.5 4 The Report identi-
fies what its authors perceive as potentially negative effects of TDF upon
economic and cultural development as well as the threat it poses to na-
tional sovereignty. 55 In economic terms, the Report describes TDF as a
major economic opportunity, which is now largely the province of MNCs
based in developed countries, especially those based in the United
States.5 6 In noneconomic terms, the Report contends that the processing
and storage of data in a foreign location inhibits a country's ability to
influence and direct its own political and cultural future. 57
Brazil is the most arresting example of TDF regulations in the con-
text of a developing country because of the explicit goals of TDF regula-
tions articulated by the Brazilian government and the severe character of
the regulations. The policies behind Brazil's program of TDF regulation
have been clearly delineated in two recent actions by the Brazilian gov-
ernment. First, in 1979 Brazil created the office of the Special Secreta-
riat of Informatics (SEI) and issued an accompanying Presidential
guideline describing Brazil's information policy.58 The espoused policy
to be implemented by the SEI is openly protectionist. The national pol-
icy mentions a commitment to protect information to ensure personal
privacy. The main thrust of the policy, however, is a commitment to
stimulate development of domestic software and hardware capability
through the systematic exclusion of potentially competitive foreign
goods, the increased direct ownership of computer facilities by the state,
and the establishment of technical standards and regulations favorable
to domestic products. 59
Second, in September 1980, the Special Commission for
Teleinformatics (Commission), a body created by the SEI to discuss is-
32 See generally M. Masmoudi, The New World Information Order (1978); United Na-
tions Economic and Social Council, Final Report: Intergovernmental Conference on Strategies
and Policies on Informatics, UNESCO, SC/MD/63 (1979).
53 Report, supra note 8.
54 Id. at 4.55 Id. at 21-23.
56 Id. at 17.
57 Id. at 23.
58 Brazilian Executive Decree No. 84.067 (October 8, 1979).
59 Brizida, The Brazilian Transborder Data Flow Policy, 4 Transnational Data Report,
No. 3 at 19 (1980).
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sues arising out of the convergence of telecommunications and data
processing technologies, issued a report. 60 In that report the Commission
endorsed SEI's practice of requiring prior approval before allowing the
establishment of transmission links to data banks outside Brazil, and re-
commended the continuation of this practice. The Commission also ar-
gued for as complete a ban as possible on the importation of all foreign
computer products. In addition, the Commission embraced the concept
of TDF regulation as a mechanism for controlling the activities of foreign
enterprises in Brazil. The Commission suggested that Brazilian policy
should be aimed at strengthening Brazilian subsidiaries in relation to for-
eign parent companies by encouraging the retention of information
within Brazil.6 1
Although at first glance Brazilian regulation of TDF links may ap-
pear similar to the Japanese authorization procedure, in practice Brazil's
authorization procedure goes considerably beyond just controlling access
to leased lines. Brazil is also beginning to control what types of hardware
may be imported into Brazil and the types of services that may be offered
once computing equipment is installed.
Applications for permission to engage in transborder transmissions
of data are processed by the Brazilian telephone company, Embratel.
TDF links are approved for a maximum of three years and renewal is
possible after the three year period upon the filing and approval of an-
other application. 62 Making an application involves completion of the
SEI's International Data Link Reporting Form, a lengthy document,
which requests disclosure of extensive information. The enterprise must
provide a detailed description of its owners and principals and their con-
nections with Brazil.63 The applicant must also describe any Brazilian
entities that would benefit from the service requested.
In addition, the applicant must describe the type of TDF link it
plans to employ, including the number of transmission lines contem-
plated, the degree of use on each line or lines, the type of hardware and
software to be used, and the transmission speed of the equipment being
utilized. 64 Total expected expenditures for equipment, personnel, royal-
ties, and training in connection with the link in question must also be
described in detail.65 The applicant is required to explain how Brazil
will benefit from institution of the applicant's service. Moreover, to the
extent that the service relies upon data processing services or equipment
in other countries, the applicant must state whether the processing could
60 Id. at 23.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 19.
63 International Data Link Form (unofficial translation), 4 Transnational Data Report,
No. 3 at 24-25, paras. 1.3, 1.4 (1980).
64 Id. paras. II.1, 11.2, IV.2, IV.3.
65 Id. para. 11.2(e).
. TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS
feasibly be done in Brazil. 66 If the proposed TDF link involves the use of
imported computer equipment, the applicant must state whether alter-
native equipment is available in Brazil and, if so, why such equipment is
inadequate. 6 7
The applicant must also describe, with particularity, data that it
expects to transmit from or receive inside Brazil. This description must
include a listing of the files and data bases to be utilized in the link, the
exact location of these files and data bases, 68 and the substantive content
of the data being transmitted. All parties who are expected to make use
of the data must be listed with an estimate of the length of time they will
use the data.69 Finally, the applicant must declare whether information
that is stored outside of Brazil can be recovered in the event of any type
of litigation in Brazil.
70
These procedures provide the Brazilian government with the means
to control both the TDF equipment and the process of TDF. While most
applications have been approved, permission has been denied in two sit-
uations. First, applications by Brazilian subsidiaries of foreign MNC's
for intracorporate TDF links have been denied. At least one such appli-
cation has been rejected on the ground that computers available inside
Brazil were adequate to perform the services required by the Brazilian
subsidiary. 7' Second, applications by computer service companies to
provide data processing services in Brazil have also been denied. An offi-
cial of the SEI has stated that some of these refusals result from the Bra-
zilian government's uncertainty as to the potential social and economic
ramifications of the proposed service. 72
The Brazilian approach to TDF is the antithesis of the open market
philosophy, which permitted the expansion of the world economy in the
post-war period. For instance, Brazil's announced intention to restrict
importation of computer products in an effort to promote the Brazilian
computer industry, if actually implemented, seemingly would conflict
with provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
to which Brazil is a signatory.73 There also appear to be potential diffi-
culties in reconciling restriction of the importation of computer products
and services with Brazil's strong emphasis on technology transfer. It is
too soon to tell, however, whether this policy will be rigorously applied
66 Id. para. III. l(c).
67 Id. para. III.l(d).
68 Id. para. IV.5.
69 Id. para. 111.2(c).
70 Id. para. 111.2(e).
71 Brizida, supra note 59, at 19.
72 Id.
73 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, open for signature Oct. 30, 1947, arts. XI, III
paras. 1, 2, 61 Stat. Parts (5) and (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, as amended (text of GATT in force in
1979 may be found at 2A Comprehensive Handbook of the United Nations 419-58 (Dr. Min-
Chuan Ku ed. 1979)); but cf. id. at art. XVIII, which permits developing countries to establish
protective measures for new industries.
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and, if so, whether it can be sustained without impairing the moderniza-
tion of Brazil's economy.
74
V. TDF Regulation Through Personal Privacy Laws
A number of foreign countries have enacted laws designed to ensure
the privacy and security of electronically stored data. 75 The majority of
these laws contain provisions regulating TDF as an adjunct to the more
general regulation of the storage and use of data. This relationship be-
tween privacy laws and TDF regulation has generated a wide range of
important issues.76 The discussion below focuses on the specific TDF
provisions found in privacy laws already in effect in a number of Euro-
pean countries.
Levels of data protection, methods of enforcement, and rights
granted data subjects differ from country to country. Consequently,
MNC's operating in a number of different countries may be confronted
with widely differing, perhaps even contradictory, privacy regulations. 77
In some cases, the regulations have led to a degree of data inspection and
expense that businesses find to be excessive even in light of the purpose of
the privacy laws. Many business leaders are concerned about the protec-
tionist impact and the possible unstated protectionist motivation, which
they suspect may be the real reason for the passage of data privacy pro-
tection statutes. 78
Existing privacy laws exhibit a tremendous diversity with respect to
74 See Transborder Data Flow Committee, A Review of the Economic Implications of
Canadian Transborder Data Flows, submitted to the Dep't of Communications of Canada
(May 1981). The Committee's position is that TDF restrictions will inhibit economic
development.
75 Laws designed to control the collection of personal data have been passed in France,
West Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, and Austria. See infra notes 89, 84,
93, 81, 129, 99, 82. Such legislation has been proposed in Spain, Great Britain, and Italy. In
addition, both Canada and the United States have enacted privacy laws that are applicable
only to information collected by the respective governments of those two countries. See infra
notes 79, 80.
76 For instance, a controversy now rages around whether data protection laws should be
extended to give substantial rights to legal as well as natural persons. The basic jurisdictional
provisions of each of the statutes discussed in this section typically begin by defining what sorts
of "data subjects" have rights with respect to data about them being stored by electronic means.
At present, the statutes in Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg, and Norway extend substantive
rights to both corporations and individuals. In a situation in which a data subject is guaranteed
access to data about him, extension of substantive data protection rights to legal persons in
theory allows one corporation access to all data concerning it stored within the files of another
corporation, including its competitors. See Hogrebe, Guidelines Concerning the Protection of
Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data, OECD Doc. No. DSTI/ICCP/81.25
(Sept. 1, 1981). For recent discussions of the broad range of political and legal issues generated
by privacy legislation in Europe, the authors recommend the following three articles as well as
the sources cited within these articles: Hondius, supra note 9; Stadlen, Survey of National Data
Protection Legislation, 3 Computer Networks 174 (1979); Evans, European Data Law, 29 AM.
J. CoMP. L. 571 (1981).
77 See Rooms & Dexter, Data Protection for Private Multinational Networks, 3 Computer
Networks 205-14 (1979).
78 See Data Flow Hearings, supra note 12.
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the degree to which transfers of data across national borders are regu-
lated. At one extreme are the privacy acts in Canada 79 and the United
States,80 which are directed only at information in government posses-
sion and are restricted to data about persons residing within each coun-
try. At the other extreme are TDF provisions, such as those of
Denmark8' and Austria,8 2 which contain detailed provisions concerning
the circumstances under which electronically stored data about any per-
son may be transmitted across the border of the country involved. 83
A. The Federal Republic of Germany
The German Privacy Statute,84 although otherwise quite detailed,
has no provisions directly addressed to TDF. Nevertheless, certain gener-
ally applicable provisions are clearly pertinent to transnational data
transfers. Data processors are prohibited from disseminating or storing
data unless the rights of the data subject, described at length elsewhere in
the statute, 85 are protected.86 Although data processors are subject to
reporting requirements, 87 TDF links do not require advance approval,
unlike some other privacy statutes discussed below. Private parties may
be temporarily restrained, however, from transmitting data pending a
determination by the Civilian Regulatory Authority. 88
B. France
The privacy statutes in France,8 9 Sweden, and Norway are more
intrusive than the German statute. The French statute provides that pri-
79 Canadian Human Rights Act, ch. 33, [1976-77] Can. Stat. 887 (1977), reprinted in
Compilation of Privacy Legislation in OECD Member Countries, OECD Doc. No.
DSTI/ICCP/79.11/04 (March 5, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Canadian Privacy Act].
80 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1976).
81 Private Registers Etc. Act of 1978, § 21(1), Act. No. 293 (Denmark), approved transla-
tion reprinted in Compilation of Privacy Legislation in OECD Member Countries, OECD Doc.
No. DSTI/ICCP/79.11/05 (March 5, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Danish Privacy Act].
82 Federal Act of 18th October, 1978, on the Protection of Personal Data (Data Protection
Act), 1978 Bundegesetzblatt No. 565 (Aus.), approved translation reprinted in Compilation of
Privacy Legislation in OECD Member Countries, OECD Doc. No. DSTI/ICCP/79.11/02
(March 5, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Austrian Privacy Act].
83 See Danish Privacy Act, supra note 81, §§ 21(l)-(3); Austrian Privacy Act, supra note
82, §§ 32-34.
84 Federal Data Protection Act ofJanuary 27, 1977, 1977 BGBI 1.201 (W. Ger.), approved
translation reprinted in Compilation of Privacy Legislation in OECD Member Countries,
OECD Do. No. DSTI/ICCP/79.1 1/01 (March 7, 1979), also reprinted in U.S. Dep't of Com-
merce, Selected Foreign National Data Protection Laws and Bills 10-42 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as W. German Privacy Act].
85 Id. § 4.
86 Id. § 1.
87 Id. §§ 22-25.
88 Id. § 13.
89 Act 78-17 of January 6, 1978 on Data Processing, Data Files and Individual Liberties,
[1978] J.O. 227, approved translation reprinted in Compilation of Privacy Legislation in OECD
Member Countries 7, OECD Doe. No. DSTI/ICCP/79.11/08 (March 5, 1978), also reprinted
in U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Selected Foreign National Data Protection Laws and Bills 48
(1978) [hereinafter cited as French Privacy Act].
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vate entities wishing to store and transmit personal information in
France must file an undertaking and reporting form with the National
Data Processing and Liberties Commission (Data Commission). 90 The
report must specify "whether the processing is intended for the dispatch
of personal data between France and another country, in any form, in-
cluding the case where it involves operations carried out partly in France
on the basis of operations previously performed outside France." 9 1 Use
of the language "between France and another country" seems to imply
that the reporting requirement extends not only to the transfer of data
generated in France for processing outside of France but also to the
transfer to France of information that has undergone data processing
outside of France.
The French statute does not require prior approval before com-
mencement of data storage and transmission. The statute does, however,
give the Data Commission the discretionary authority to make particular
TDF activities subject to prior approval after the initial notification pro-
cess. 92 The Data Commission does not have this authority with respect
to data processing activities in France that do not involve TDF.
C Sweden
Enacted in 1973, Sweden's privacy statute was Europe's first such
statute.93 Under the Swedish law the formation of a data bank, which
will contain personal information, is subject to prior approval by a Data
Inspection Board (DIB).9 4 Specific DIB approval must be obtained for
transborder exchanges of information. 95 Data transmissions within Swe-
den are subject to general regulations promulgated by the DIB after ini-
tial approval is obtained for creation of a data bank.96 Therefore, the
law subjects transborder data transmissions to more stringent regulation
than transmissions of data from one point to another within Sweden.
The DIB's authority is activated under the Swedish statute "[i]f there is
reason to believe that personal information will be used for [automatic
data processing] abroad. . . ,,97 Instances already documented by
other authors in which specific firms have been denied TDF approval
demonstrate that the Swedish DIB's approval of transborder data trans-
missions is hardly proforma.9 8
90 Id. § 15.
91 Id. § 19.
92 Id. § 24.
93 Data Act of May I1, 1973 (Sweden), translation reprinted in Compilation of Privacy
Legislation in OECD Member Countries, OECD Doc. No. DSTI/ICCP/79.11/18 (March 5,
1979), also reprinted in U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Selected Foreign National Data Protection
Laws and Bills 71 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Swedish Privacy Act].
94 Id. § 2.
95 Id. § II.
96 Id. § 6.
97 Id. § 11.
98 See Stadlen, supra note 76, at 185-86.
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D. Norway
Under the Norwegian privacy statute international data transmis-
sions must be approved on a case-by-case basis. 99 Although the statute
does provide for the promulgation of regulations creating exceptions to
this requirement, 100 none has been issued to date. Data processing inside
Norway is subject to general prior approval, but there is no domestic
counterpart to the case-by-case approval required for transborder trans-
fers of data. The statute further provides for the drafting of regulations
to ensure cooperation between the Norwegian data protection agency,
the Data Surveillance Service, and administrative authorities in other
countries involved in the protection of electronically processed informa-
tion.' 0 ' This last provision seems to be designed for the day when Nor-
way will take steps to harmonize its data protection laws with those of
other European countries, either as a member of the EEC or pursuant to
the Council of Europe's Treaty on Personal Privacy Protection.'
0 2
E. Denmark
The privacy statutes of Austria and Denmark are more complex and
more specific than any of the other European statutes regulating TDF.
Both statutes prescribe substantive principles for the protection of per-
sonal information and require prior authorization or licensing of TDF by
a national data control authority.1
0 3
Under the Danish law, data may not be gathered in Denmark or
transmitted out of Denmark without a license. The law thus requires
prior approval by the Data Surveillance Authority (DSA) before per-
sonal data may even be gathered for potential transfer outside the coun-
try. 0 4 Further, the Danish act prohibits the gathering of certain types of
data under any circumstances. 0 5 The statute explicitly extends this pro-
hibition to the gathering of data to be stored outside of Denmark.' 
06
The DSA must also review proposed TDF links to ensure that the
contemplated transfer of data will not significantly lower the level of pro-
tection accorded to data in Denmark. 0 7 If, however, the DSA makes a
blanket determination that the data protection law in a given foreign
99 Norwegian Act of June 9, 1978 Relating to Personal Data Registers, para. 36, approved
translation reprinted in Compilation of Privacy Legislation in OECD Member Countries,
OECD Doc. No. DSTI/ICCP/79.11/14 (March 5, 1979), also reprinted in U.S. Dep't of Com-
merce, Selected Foreign National Data Protection Laws and Bills 145-67 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Norwegian Privacy Act].
100 Id.
101 Id. para. 37.
102 See generally note 110 infra.
103 Austrian Privacy Act, supra note 82, §§ 1, 32; Danish Privacy Act, supra note 81, §§ 1,
21(l).
104 Id. § 3(2).
105 Id. § 21(1).
106 Id. § 21(3).
107 Id. § 21(4).
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country meets Danish standards, then the case-by-case licensing require-
ment need not be met.108
The Danish law also exempts from the licensing requirement TDF
transmissions involving data stored in a data bank "which is found in
Denmark solely for the purpose of undergoing electronic data process-
ing." 10 9 The exception to the licensing requirement for foreign data may
be explained in terms of a desire to minimize the resources necessary to
achieve the privacy protection goals of the Danish Data Protection Act.
While the exemption of foreign data from protection under the Danish
privacy law does not have an obvious negative impact on the privacy
interest of Danish citizens, it would be interesting to see how the law is
applied in practice to data about Danish citizens.
The more compelling reason for the exemption is a desire to protect
and encourage data processing activities within Denmark. The excep-
tion for foreign data indicates a desire to reduce impediments to the im-
port of data into Denmark for storage and processing. Application of
this exemption, however, would make it more difficult to harmonize
Denmark's regulatory initiatives with those of other countries. The
Council of Europe's recent treaty concerning the protection of personal
privacy calls for harmonized levels of data protection as between signa-
tory countries.' "0 The Danish law seeks to deal with this problem by
giving the Danish Minister of Justice power to suspend the operation of
the exemption with respect to "other specified countries or specified types
of [data banks]."'
F A4ustn'
The Austrian statute's 1 2 provisions governing transborder data flow
are more detailed than any other European privacy statute currently in
force. As with a number of statutes previously discussed, the Austrian
108 Id. § 21(2).
109 Id. § 21(3).
110 Convention for the Protection of Individuals With Regard to Automatic Processing of
Personal Data, January 28, 1981, Council of Europe. Chapter III of the Convention, entitled
Transborder Data Flows, reads as follows:
(1) The following provisions shall apply to transfers across national borders, by
whatever medium of personal data undergoing automatic processing or collected
with a view to their being automatically processed.
(2) A party shall not, for the sole purpose of the protection of privacy, prohibit
or subject to special authorization transborder flows of personal data going to the
territory of another Party.
(3) Nevertheless, each Party shall be entitled to derogate from the provisions of
paragraph 2: (a) insofar as its legislation includes specific regulations for certain
categories of personal data or of automated personal data files, because of the
nature of those data or those files, except where the regulations of the other Party
provide an equivalent protection; (b) when the transfer is made from its territory
to the territory of a non-Contracting State through the intermediary of the terri-
tory of another Party, in order to avoid such transfers resulting in circumvention
of the legislation of the Party referred to at the beginning of this paragraph.
111 Danish Privacy Act, supra note 81, § 21(4).
112 Austrian Privacy Act, supra note 82.
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enactment also requires approval of an administrative body, the Data
Protection Commission (DPC), before data can be transmitted out of
Austria. Prior approval of the DPC is required (1) whenever data cross
the Austrian border for any type of processing outside Austria, even if the
data are subsequently stored inside Austria," 13 and (2) whenever there is
"direct access" to data stored on Austrian territory equipment outside
Austria. 114 In addition, the DPC must be notified whenever any com-
pany operating in Austria processes Austrian data for foreign persons or
companies outside Austria. 115 Such processing services are subject to
prior approval by the DPC "where so provided by international agree-
ment." 116 Finally, the DPC must be notified of all situations in which
equipment on Austrian territory has direct access to personal data stored
outside Austria."1 7 These provisions constitute, collectively, a compre-
hensive regulation of all TDF links involving personal data between Aus-
tria and the rest of the world.
The burden of these provisions is limited, however, by exemptions:
(1) for data transmitted to a country that affords such data legal protec-
tion comparable to the Austrian law," 8 (2) as provided in international
agreements between Austria and other countries,' 19 and (3) uniquely,
"where the person responsible for the data processing is himself the per-
son affected by the data transferred."1 20 Since the Austrian statute de-
fines the term "persons affected" as "natural or legal persons or
associations of persons under commercial law,"' 2 1 this provision exempts
intra-corporate transmission of data from Austria.
The Austrian Privacy Statute also sets forth explicit criteria to be
applied by a data processing authority in determining whether to grant
permission for the transfer of data outside of the country. The statute
provides that such approval shall be given if four criteria are met.
122
First, the transfer must not conflict with the public interest, specifically
described as including obligations under international law.' 23 Second,
the transfer must comply with the rules applicable to all transfers of per-
sonal data 24 concerning the circumstances under which personal data
may be disclosed. Third, the Commission must find that the transfer
does not harm the interests of the person whose personal data will be
transmitted out of Austria.'
25
113 Id. §§ 32, 34(1).
'14 Id. §§ 32, 34(2).
115 Id. § 33.
116 Id.
117 Id. § 34(2).
118 Id. § 32(2)2.
''9 Id. § 32(2)3.
120 Id. § 32(2)1.
121 Id. § 3(2).
122 Id. § 32(3).
123 Id. § 32(3)1.
124 Id. § 32(3)2.
125 Id. § 32(3)3.
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The fourth requirement is triggered only when the transfer abroad is
made by a service company that processes data for other clients. 126 In
that event, certain additional safeguards applicable to all offerings of
data processing services are incorporated by reference. This provision
may, however, be satisifed by compliance through "adequate safeguards
• . . agreed upon" by the parties to the transaction. 127 One writer re-
cently suggested that private contracts be employed to ensure a sufficient
level of privacy protection in the transferee country to satisfy the trans-
feror country's privacy law.' 28 Indeed, the Austrian statute seems not
only to contemplate such private contractual arrangements, but in cer-
tain circumstances to require them.
The authors have been advised that American companies operating
in Austria have encountered difficulties in transmitting data to other Eu-
ropean countries for processing. We understand that the transmissions
have been permitted to continue, however, where it has been demon-
strated, to the satisfaction of the Austrian authorities, that the protec-
tions given the data under internal company procedure or foreign law
meet the requirements of Austrian law. Apparently, this process involves
a detailed examination of corporate procedures by Austrian officials.
G. The United Kingdom
Reportedly, the British Government has recently decided to intro-
duce in the Parliament privacy legislation that would apply to trans-
border data flows. The United Kingdom is a significant center of data
processing activity, and British authorities apparently wish to demon-
strate to other countries that there is no reason to be concerned about the
protection of personal information transmitted to the United Kingdom
for processing and/or storage.
H Other European States
At this time, there is no privacy legislation applicable to private
transborder data flow in other European countries, such as Italy and the
Low Countries. Although Luxembourg has recently enacted data pro-
tection legislation, 129 the law has thus far only been applied to data stor-
age facilities operated by public authorities in Luxembourg. 130
Following the recent political scandal concerning certain Masonic Lodg-
es, Italian authorities have issued regulations ordering the security police
to take inventory of all data banks in the country containing personal
126 Id. § 32(3)4.
127 Id.
128 See Note, Contracts for Transnational Information Services: Securing Equivalency for
Data Protection, 22 Harv. Int'l L.J. 157 (1981).
129 Luxembourg Data Bank Bill of March 31, 1979, reprinted in U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Selected Foreign Data Protection Laws and Bills 133-44 (1978).
130 See Hogrebe, supra note 76, at 40.
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information.' 3 1 The regulations specifically describe these listing re-
quirements as a precursor to the drafting of privacy protection legislation
by the Italian Parliament. 32 A data protection law is also under study
by a Justice Committee in Belgium; many aspects of the proposed Bel-
gian statute, however, are said to be unsatisfactory from a business point
of view. ' 33
VI. Control of Foreign Investment as TDF Regulation: Canada
In 1978 a special investigative committee, created by the Canadian
Government, issued a report entitled The Implications of Telecommun'cations
for Canadian Sovereignty, popularly known as the Clyne Report. 134 The
Clyne Report begins with the proposition that all aspects of Canadian
telecommunications, including TDF, must be regulated by the Canadian
Government to preserve Canadian sovereignty. 135 The Canadian Gov-
ernment has never officially endorsed the conclusions or proposals con-
tained in the Clyne Report, however, and officials of the Canadian
embassy have indicated to the authors that the Clyne Report cannot be
considered a statement of Canadian policy with respect to TDF. The
TDF policy was described by these officials to be still in a state of flux
pending further consideration by the relevant agencies of the Canadian
Government.
Nevertheless, Canada illustrates a situation in which controls over
various types of foreign investment seem to have begun to reflect a spe-
cific concern about TDF. In 1974 Canada passed the Foreign Invest-
ment Review Act, 136 a statute designed to control foreign investment in
Canada. Some members of the business community, however, have al-
leged that the statute has been applied in a particularly stringent fashion
to foreign investment in the Canadian computer service industry. The
case of Comshare, Incorporated (Comshare), an American corporation,
which was unable to obtain approval of its plan to buy controlling inter-
ests in a Canadian computer service company in which it held a minority
position, illustrates the tendency. The Canadian company, CSL, Ltd.
(CSL), was formed by Comshare in 1968. In 1970, because of financing
needs, Comshare sold its controlling interest in CSL to another Canadian
company. The buyer was not a computer service firm, but rather an
investment firm seeking to diversify its portfolio. In 1978, after CSL had
established a successful position in the Canadian service market, Com-
131 See Declaration of the Ministry of the Interior, Department of the Security Police. Gov-
ernment Document N.558/6.D.I.2, Rome, September 18, 1981.
132 Id. at 4.
133 International Chamber of Commerce, Commission on Computing, Telecommunica-
tions, and Information Policies, Note on the Meeting of October 9, 1981, at 4, I.C.C. Doc. No.
373/7 (1981).
134 Canadian Dep't of Communications, Consultative Committee on the Implications of
Telecommunications for Canadian Sovereignty, Clyne Report (1979).
135 Id. at 2.
136 Foreign Investment Review Act, ch. 46, 1973-74 Can. Stat. 619 (1973).
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share approached its Canadian partner with a buy-out proposal and the
Canadian company agreed.1
37
In an effort to obtain approval for the proposed acquisition, Corn-
share made extensive disclosures to the Canadian Government concern-
ing its own finances and development plans, as well as the finances and
development plans of CSL.' 3 8 In addition, Comshare agreed, in writing,
to remain subject to continued reporting requirements in connection
with any proposed reorganization or disposal of CSL's assets. Finally,
Comshare committed itself to a detailed program of future expansion
designed to benefit the Canadian economy. This proposed expansion
would have included additional Canadian investment, training of Cana-
dian nationals, transfer of technology to Canada, and a promise to begin
the export of data processing services to countries outside Canada. 39
Despite these representations, the application was ultimately denied on
the ground that the proposed acquisition would not be of significant ben-
efit to Canada.14°
Another example of the interrelationship between Canadian regula-
tion of foreign investment and Canadian regulation of TDF is the re-
cently enacted Banks and Banking Law Revision of 1980 (Canadian
Bank Act). 14 1 The Canadian Bank Act is a comprehensive revision of
Canadian banking law. We are concerned here, however, with only two
sections of the Act, one pertaining to the chartering of foreign banks and
the other pertaining to the maintenance of bank records. Under the Ca-
nadian Bank Act foreign banks can, for the first time, charter subsidiaries
in Canada directly. International banking is perhaps the most informa-
tion intensive of multinational endeavors.' 42 Therefore, increased Amer-
ican banking activity in Canada in the wake of chartering opportunities
would certainly increase the possibility that electronically-processed
banking records would be stored or processed in the United States. Ac-
cordingly, the Canadian Bank Act contains provisions specifically
designed to deal with such an occurrence.
Certain types of bank customer records must be maintained in Ca-
nada. These records must describe "for each customer of the bank on a
daily basis, particulars of the transactions between the bank and that
customer and the balance owing to or by the bank in respect of that
customer. . . . '43 In addition, banks are required to retain in either
printed, film, or electronic form "all registers and other records required
or authorized" by the banking law including "any entries, books, vouch-
137 I.C. Reorganization Hearings, supra note 3, at 208-09.
138 Id. at 234-47.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 251.
141 Canadian Bank Act, 1980, c. 40 § 155 passim, Vol. 2, No. 7, Can. Gaz. Ill (1980).
142 See I.C. Reorganization Hearings, supra note 3, at 337, 341, 377, 420 (letters from U.S.
banking officials to Glenn English, Chairman of Government Information and Individual
Rights Subcommittee).
143 Canadian Bank Act, supra note 141, para. 157(4)(a).
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ers, paid instruments, signature cards, signing authorities,. . . in the pos-
session of the bank .... ,,44 In the event a given bank chooses to
maintain the required records in electronic form, the bank must store the
data in Canada and maintain equipment there "that is capable of repro-
ducing any required information in intelligible written form within a
reasonable time. . .. ,,145 It may be assumed that this final requirement
will require maintenance in Canada, not only of electronically stored
data, but also of the software necessary to retrieve such data for inspec-
tion. Finally, banks are required to "maintain and process in Canada,
any information or data relating to the preparation and maintenance" of
required banking records. 146
Copies and extracts from required records may be processed outside
of Canada under certain conditions. Such processing is only permissible
where "the bank shall so inform the [inspector of banks] and provide him
with a description of the nature of those copies or extracts maintained
outside Canada and a description of the further processing of informa-
tion or data relating to such copies or extracts outside Canada .... 141
The Inspector of Banks is then empowered to prevent processing
outside Canada, if he becomes convinced that "further processing outside
Canada . . . is incompatible with the fulfillment of his responsibilities
.... "148 The Act also empowers the Canadian Minister of Finance to
suspend processing outside of Canada in the event that the Minister con-
cludes "such further processing is not in the national interest .... ,, 49
The standards to be applied in determining whether to allow TDF
may reflect the differing motivations behind passage of the Canadian
Bank Act. The Bank Inspector's power to prevent TDF arguably reflects
the general purpose of the Act, viz. to protect the integrity of the banking
system by ensuring that the Bank Inspector has sufficient access to bank
records to perform his oversight function. The power given to the Minis-
ter of Finance to suspend bank-related TDF, however, appears to open
the way for the Canadian Government to regulate data processing by
banks as a means of achieving broader economic and political goals.
VII. Future Directions
The pace of developments in this field is so rapid that much of what
has been written above could be outdated by the time it is published. No
crystal ball is required, however, to predict that the following trends will
continue: (a) the rapid development and application of new computer
and telecommunications technologies; (b) the introduction of new do-
mestic and international electronic data, voice, and video services;
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(c) the restructuring of commercial activity in the data serv-
ices/telecommunications fields as new technologies make it difficult to
maintain old regulatory distinctions; (d) increased national actions and
regulation affecting transborder data flows as governments take measures
to protect personal privacy and national perceptions of security and cul-
tural interests, to encourage the development of domestic computer and
data processing industries, and to develop public data networks in com-
petition with private industry; and (e) increased activity in international
organizations attempting to come to grips with the real and perceived
problems of transborder data flow.
During the past four or five years American industry has been criti-
cal of the government for not having "a policy" or an organization to
deal with TDF issues.' 50 The business community, however, has diverse
interests, conflicting priorities, and considerable ambivalence about the
role of the government in this evolving theatre of operations.' 5' On the
one hand, there is considerable reticence to embark upon the develop-
ment of an international legal regime for TDF. The concern is that in-
ternational agreements will result in more TDF restriction, rather than
less.' 52 This apprehension is understandable when one considers state-
ments made by the French and others, relating the need for international
agreements to the significance of TDF for the international division of
labor and the distribution of wealth among nations. 53
On the other hand, there is increasing demand in both U.S. business
and government circles for new multi-national agreements to facilitate
international services trade. The Reagan Administration is seeking
agreement that "services" will be on the agenda of the General Agree-
ment on Tariff and Trade (GATT) Ministerial Meeting to be held in
Geneva in October 1982. Any such initiative is bound to touch upon
important aspects of TDF. Data processing is an important service in-
dustry in its own right, and many other service industries, such as bank-
ing, insurance, and airlines, also.are dependent on TDF. It remains to be
seen whether the member states will be able to reach agreement on TDF
related issues.
The executive branch is not the only branch of the United States
Government engaged in TDF initiatives. The Congress is currently con-
sidering a broad based revision of the entire structure by which the fed-
eral government regulates communications. 54  A bill passed by the
Senate prior to the settlement of the government's antitrust action
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TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS
against AT&T 5 5 gives the FCC authority to ensure that
the entry of foreign carriers or foreign persons supplying telecommunica-
tions or information services, facilities, or equipment into domestic
United States telecommunications markets [is] upon terms and condi-
tions which are reciprocal with the terms and conditions under which
United States persons are permitted entry into-
(1) the foreign nation in which the operations of such foreign per-
sons offering telecommunications or information services, facilities, or
equipment is based; and
(2) the foreign nation under the laws of which such foreign tele-
communications or information services, facilities, or equipment opera-
tions are established.1
56
Traditionally, the United States has eschewed such "reciprocity" re-
quirements in trade relations, but there are signs that this consensus is
weakening. It would be far better if trade issues, including TDF, could
be resolved without such measures. It is hoped that the services initiative
in the GATT and restraints by our trading partners will afford a
solution.
The United States has every reason to insist that the national and
international policies that promote the free movement of capital, tech-
nology, and goods in the world economy apply equally to the transfer of
information and to the supply of related services. Multinational enter-
prises will not be able to make the economic contribution that is their
strength if they are unable to transfer information freely among their
affiliates. Further, the United States is increasingly dependent in its for-
eign trade on the export of services and high technology, including data
processing services. If the American economy is to retain its capacity to
absorb the products of other nations, it will need access to foreign mar-
kets for the goods and services it can provide competitively. To protect
these interests, the Government needs to ensure that our trading partners
will continue to permit access to foreign facilities for data processing and
storage and to provide economic telecommunications links for these
facilities.
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was settled on January 8, 1982. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1982, at 1.
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